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Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single
human being in a split-personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently inde-
pendent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our
being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a
split-personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about
mental unity and disunity determine how many people there are. I suggest that the num-
ber of human people is simply the number of appropriately endowed human animals.
1 .
We all know stories about split personality, or “dissociative-identity disorder”
as the psychiatrists say. Someone suddenly changes so radically in his
behavior, personality, beliefs, mental abilities, moral qualities, and even
physical features that we scarcely recognize him, and later reverts just as sud-
denly to his original condition. The good-hearted physician Jekyll becomes a
ruthless criminal, Hyde, and after a night’s rampage changes back again, hor-
rified at what he has done, all the more so for fear that he may do it again.
One person somehow has two personalities.
Others tell the story differently: a single human being is somehow the
home of two different thinking agents—two people or persons—who alter-
nate in controlling its movements. Jekyll may be horrified at what Hyde has
done, but he himself has done nothing wrong, apart from performing the ill-
fated pharmacological experiment that brought Hyde into being.
Which way of telling the story is the right one depends on whether Jekyll
is Hyde—whether Jekyll and Hyde are two or one. Split personality raises
questions about our identity because both descriptions seem right. We want
to say that there is just one person in the story, who simply thinks and acts
in very different ways at different times, because there is just one human
being or human animal there. We also want to say that there are two
people—that Jekyll isn’t Hyde—because that one human being thinks and
acts, so to speak, as if it were two. Yet the two descriptions are incompati-
ble: Jekyll and Hyde cannot be both identical and not identical.
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The second description has a good deal of support. Some experts think
that two or more people—two intelligent, rational, self-conscious
beings—share a single human being in some real cases of split personality.
Many more think that it might happen, if only the split were deep enough. If
the personalities in such a case were ever individually full and well-rounded
and independent of one another in the right way, whether or not this ever
happens in real life, the people would outnumber the human beings. For
want of a better name, I will call this the Cohabitation Claim. Doubts about
whether there are more people than human beings in actual cases of split per-
sonality are almost always about whether the personalities in those cases are
ever sufficiently full or independent of one another. Though many doubt
whether the antecedent of the Cohabitation Claim is ever satisfied, few ques-
tion the Claim itself.1 This is not surprising. The Claim follows from the
idea, almost universally held since Locke, that the number of people in a
situation is determined by psychological facts, in particular by facts about
psychological unity and disunity. Nearly everyone assumes that if you have
two centers of consciousness, or points or view, or unified and independent
systems of mental functioning or the like, you necessarily have two different
thinking beings. I will say more about this general principle later.
I am going to argue that the Cohabitation Claim is false. There could
never be two or more people in a case of split personality, no matter how
deep the split. I reject the Claim because it appears to rule out any plausible
view about what sort of things you and I are. In particular, it rules out our
being material things—things made of flesh and blood. If we think carefully
about what we are, and especially about what non-mental properties we have,
we will see that there is simply no room for two of us within one human
being. Or at least not in a split-personality case. If this is right, it has impor-
tant consequences for the neglected but important question of what determines
how many of us there are at any one time, the so-called problem of syn-
chronic identity. It implies that the number of thinking beings does not fol-
low from facts about mental unity and disunity.
                                                                                                        
1 Gillett (1986) and Lizza (1993) doubt the antecedent but not the Claim. Anderson (1976),
Wilkes (1988: 127f.), and Radden (1996) say that there is more than one thinking being in
actual cases of split personality; see also Broad (1923: 16). The Cohabitation Claim dates
back at least as far as Locke (1975: 344); its contemporary advocates include MacIntosh
(1974: 455f.), Shoemaker (1984: 97), Carruthers (1986: 226), Glover (1988: 25), Lowe
(1996: 31), and Rovane (1998: 169ff.). Hofstadter and Dennett define split personality as
“two or more persons ‘inhabiting’ one body for alternating periods of time” (1981: 479).
Note that the Claim is that there could be two numerically different people within one
human being. The idea that someone suffering from split personality might “be” two dif-
ferent people in a sense not involving numerical identity, in something like the way that
an actress might alternate between “being” Ophelia and “being” Rosalind, is of no meta-
physical interest.
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2 .
Let us have a concrete example. We want a representative test case, one where
two different people would share one human being if this could ever be so due
to split personality. The story of Jekyll and Hyde is not, alas, ideal for this
purpose. Nor are the fascinating real cases of Christine Beauchamp, Eve, or
Sybil. So with some reluctance I will set aside these colorful characters of
fiction and clinical history and turn instead to a comparatively dull philoso-
pher’s story—one designed to avoid the sorts of anomalies and unexpected
twists that may make for a good tale, but are likely to lead us astray.
Imagine, then, a human being with two personalities, one of which is
“out” or active on even days, and the other of which is active on odd days.
Each day at midnight, like clockwork, one personality goes dormant and the
other takes over. Call the being who thinks and acts on even days Even and
the one who thinks and acts on odd days Odd. (By ‘thinking’ or ‘thought’ I
mean any sort of mental activity or state.) Suppose that Even cannot recall,
on even days, anything that Odd thinks or does on odd days, and that Odd
likewise cannot recall on odd days anything that Even does or thinks on even
days. On even days, Even can learn what Odd did or experienced on past odd
days only by doing detective work: by interrogating witnesses and examining
traces of Odd’s behavior, such as the mess he left in the bedroom. Even sin-
cerely denies, on even days, any responsibility for what Odd does on odd days.
Even’s thoughts and actions on even days affect those of Odd on odd days in
something like the way that your thoughts and actions might affect those of
someone who shared your living quarters and slept in your bed, but who was
always out when you were at home so that you never met. Likewise for Odd,
on odd days, with respect to even-day thoughts and actions. Let the two per-
sonalities be as full and well-rounded as the circumstances permit, so that no
one familiar with Even on even days or with Odd on odd days would have any
reason to suspect anything unusual, apart from their curious inability to
report firsthand on events or experiences from alternate days. (They might
claim to spend every second day asleep.)
If this is not enough to get us to think that Even and Odd are two people
if there could ever be two people in a split-personality case, let the two per-
sonalities be very different. Even (on even days) is cheerful and gregarious,
while Odd (on odd days) is sullen and withdrawn. Even enjoys smoking on
even days; Odd detests it on odd days. We may want to add that the even-day
and the odd-day thoughts could no more become integrated, through psycho-
therapy or the like, than your thoughts could become integrated with mine.
Fill out the story as you like, resolving any further details in whatever way
would most favor the view that there are two people.
If the case histories we find in textbooks of abnormal psychology are
accurate, something not all too different from this ought to be possible, even
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if it would be unlikely ever to arise except perhaps as the result of an elabo-
rate and highly immoral medical experiment. Those who distrust fanciful
thought experiments may want to replace my story with whatever they think
is the possible case of split personality most likely to involve more than one
thinking being, and imagine my comments modified so as to apply to it.
My question, then, is whether Even—the one who thinks and acts on even
days—is Odd, the one who thinks and acts on odd days. Are Even and Odd
two or one? Is the being who is cheerful and gregarious on even days the one
who is sullen and withdrawn on odd days, or a numerically different being?
This question is not answered simply by the way we introduced the names
‘Even’ and ‘Odd’. Even was said to be the one who thinks and acts on even
days; that doesn’t by itself rule out his also thinking and acting on odd days,
or Odd’s thinking and acting on even days. I will assume that the Cohabita-
tion Claim is true if and only if Even and Odd would be two different beings.
3 .
I fear that some may doubt whether there is any objective fact here to be
discovered. “Whether Even is Odd depends on how we choose to describe the
case. It depends on our concept of a person. According to one concept, Even
and Odd are two. According to another, they are one. We cannot say which is
right until we settle on a concept. More likely our ordinary concept of a
person is simply not up to the task. Being designed to deal with ordinary life,
it isn’t precise enough to tell us in all possible cases whether we have one
person or two. So we cannot discover whether Even is Odd. At most we can
decide the matter by sharpening our concept of a person.”
This is rather puzzling. The question was whether the being who thinks
and acts on even days also thinks and acts on odd days—whether there is one
thinking, acting being in the story or more than one. What has that got to do
with our concept of a person? If there really is something that thinks and acts
on even days, and something that thinks and acts on odd days, and if there
really is such a relation as numerical identity—and without these assump-
tions there are no questions about personal identity in cases like this—then
those beings must be either identical or distinct. (Or it may be indeterminate:
“they” might be neither definitely one nor definitely two. But that too would
be an answer to our question.) How could there be “no fact of the matter”?
How could it be up to us to decide?
Presumably the idea is something like this. There are really many think-
ing, acting beings in the story. Some think and act only on even days, some
only on odd days, some on both even and odd days. Strictly speaking, there is
no one being that thinks and acts on even days, or any one being that thinks
and acts on odd days. There are many such beings. So until we are told more,
the names ‘Even’ and ‘Odd’ will be ambiguous in their reference. ‘Even’ will
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refer to at least one being that thinks and acts only on even days, but also to
at least one being that thinks and acts on both even and odd days, and like-
wise, mutatis mutandis, for ‘Odd’. We can say whether Even is or isn’t Odd
only once we have disambiguated the names, as we might do by sharpening
our concept of a person and stipulating that ‘Even’ and ‘Odd’ are to name
people in that sharpened sense. If we adopt a person-concept that applies to
only one of the beings in the story—one that thinks and acts on both even
and odd days—we will say that Even is Odd. If we adopt a concept that
applies to more than one being—in particular to at least one that acts only on
even days and to one that acts only on odd days—we will say that Even is not
Odd (though of course we won’t strictly be speaking of the same “Even” and
“Odd” in both cases).
But in that case the objective fact, and the answer to our question, is that
there aren’t just one or two thinking beings in the story, but three at least,
and probably many more. Our question was not how many such things would
count as “people” on one or another sharpening of that concept, but how
many thinking beings there are. So those who say that our question has no
answer to be discovered appear to be assuming the Cohabitation Claim at the
outset. Or if this is not what they have in mind, it will be hard to understand
them.
Someone might deny that there is any fact about how many thinking
beings there are until we sharpen that concept. But again, it will be hard to
understand this unless it implies that the story contains a largish number of
beings that are candidates, so to speak, for being thinkers (that qualify as
thinkers on at least one admissible sharpening of that concept). That too is an
answer, though a messy one, to our question, and one that entails at least a
close variant of the Cohabitation Claim. I can see no way round the question.
4 .
Before arguing against the Cohabitation Claim I will briefly discuss two
arguments in support of it.
The first I will call the argument from personhood, since it is based on the
general idea that we work out how many people there are in a given situation
by analyzing the concept of a person (Anderson 1976, Wilkes 1988: 120-123,
Rovane 1998: 172). We start by arguing that anything with such-and-such
features is a person. The number of beings in the situation that have those
features will then give us the number of people there. The premise about how
many beings have the relevant features is supposed to be an empirical matter
that can be read off, in principle if not in practice, from an adequate clinical
description of the case. The philosophical work lies in deciding what makes
something a person, as opposed to a non-person.
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Let us apply this idea to the case at hand. Wilkes says that a person is
anything that is rational, is the subject of intentional states, is appropriately
treated as a moral agent, can reciprocate when so treated, uses language, and
has some sort of self-consciousness. Suppose that is right. Presumably we
can agree that both Even and Odd have those six features. Does it follow that
there are at least two people there?
Hardly. I think I can say without boasting that I satisfy Wilkes’s criteria
for being a person. So does the author of this essay. Yet that is obviously
compatible with the fact that I am the author of this essay. What the argu-
ment needs is the premise that Even and Odd are numerically different. But
that was just the point at issue. The trouble is that the argument works only
once we have identified and counted all the beings in the story that are candi-
dates for being people. Only then can we count the people by noting how
many of those candidates satisfy our criteria of personhood. Until we know
whether Even is Odd, it is no help to be told whether Even and Odd are
people. Our question is precisely how many serious candidates there
are—how many rational, thinking beings. And here the argument from per-
sonhood offers no guidance.
Wilkes and Rovane say that the candidates for personhood in cases like
ours are personalities. The case history will tell us how many personalities
there are, and their mental properties; we philosophers need only apply our
criteria of personhood to those personalities to see how many qualify. In our
story there are clearly two personalities, each of which is rational, has beliefs
and desires, and so on. Thus, each of them is a person, and so there are two
people.
But again, this is not an argument for the Cohabitation Claim. It simply
asserts that there are two rational, thinking beings in the story. To support
the Cohabitation Claim Wilkes and Rovane would have to argue, first, that
there are two things called ‘personalities’ in the story, and, second, that those
things are rational, thinking beings. They provide no such argument.
In any case, their position is incredible. What sort of thing is a personal-
ity? We don’t ordinarily use the term to refer to countable objects at all, but
merely as a way of talking about people’s mental and behavioral features.
(We wouldn’t say that someone had two different smiles. Or if we did, we
wouldn’t take it to imply that anyone literally had two of something.) If there
really are two concrete objects called personalities in our story—and if this is
a point that we can take as a premise in an argument for the Cohabitation
Claim without assuming the point at issue—then a personality would seem
to be some sort of complex psychological attribute, or perhaps a collection of
mental and behavioral events or dispositions. The question then is whether a
psychological attribute or a collection of mental events can literally be
rational or self-conscious, or think or act or be responsible for its actions.
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Are you and I attributes or collections of mental items—rather than, say, men
and women? (Whatever else men and women are, they are made at least partly
of flesh and blood, and not entirely of mental items.) Wilkes apparently
thinks that we are. Rovane says explicitly that we are “sets of intentional
episodes” (1998: 212).
This strikes me as absurd. Collections of thoughts and experiences don’t
fret about the future or drink coffee or feel tired. The thing you see or point to
when you see or point to me is not a set of intentional episodes. Certainly
the argument from personhood supports no such claim. On the other hand, if
‘personality’ just means a certain sort of person—as when we say that Woody
Allen is a famous cinema personality—then the number of “personalities”
there are in the story is just the point at issue, and once again needs to be
argued for and not simply assumed.
5 .
The second argument for the Cohabitation Claim attempts to derive the num-
ber of thinking beings from facts about how particular mental states relate to
one another. It is based not on the concept of a person, but on that of a men-
tal state or property. The idea derives from Kant, who suggested that part of
what makes something a mental state of a particular being, and hence a men-
tal state at all, is that being’s ability to combine or synthesize it with its
other mental states (Critique of Pure Reason B134).
Rather than discuss Kant directly, I will take on someone nearer my own
size. Shoemaker’s recent argument that the Cohabitation Claim follows from
the functionalist theory of mind is Kantian enough, I hope, but easier to
understand (1979: 335, 1984: 94-97). The functionalist theory characterizes
mental states partly in terms of the way they are disposed to combine with
other mental states to produce further mental states and behavior. If I prefer
chocolate to vanilla, it is part of the nature of that preference that it dispose
me to choose chocolate over vanilla unless I want something else that I think
I could get by acting otherwise. Mental states and actions come by nature in
packages: no state of mine could be a desire, belief, or experience without
being combined with other mental states with which it is disposed to interact
in this sort of characteristic way, and without such combinations at least
potentially producing characteristic behavior. We might call the packages of
mental particulars and actions interrelated in this way mental systems. (I hesi-
tate to call them minds, as that word is often used as a synonym for ‘person’
or ‘thinking being’. We don’t want to assume that mental systems are think-
ing beings.)
Shoemaker then argues like this: (1) The even-day thoughts and actions
make up one mental system, and the odd-day thoughts and actions form
another. That was part of our story. If Even wants chocolate on an even day,
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that desire will in no way be disposed to interact with Odd’s belief, manifest
only on odd days, that there is chocolate in the bottom drawer, to produce
appropriate action, any more than my desires are disposed to interact with
your beliefs to produce action. (2) The even-day thoughts belong to someone,
and the odd-day thoughts belong to someone. This could fail to be the case
only if there were no thinking beings in the story at all, and hence no think-
ing beings anywhere and no problems about personal identity. (3) Nothing
could be the subject of two mental systems. Hence, (4) the subject of the
even-day thoughts is not the subject of the odd-day thoughts. Even and Odd
are two.
The synthesis argument, as we might call this, is more promising than
the argument from personhood. It makes no contentious assumptions about
how many person-candidates there are, or about whether Even is Odd, or
about our being literally bundles of thoughts. It starts with facts that might
reasonably be thought to fall out of any neutral description of the case,
applies a plausible principle to them, and deduces the number of thinking
beings.
Is it persuasive? I want to know why there couldn’t be two mental
systems unless there are two thinking beings. Isn’t that just the point at
issue? It doesn’t follow from the functionalist theory of mind. As it is ordi-
narily understood, anyway, the theory says only that every mental state must
belong to a mental system. Shoemaker argues like this: Functionalism
implies that a mental state of mine must be disposed to interact in character-
istic ways with other mental states and actions that make up a mental
system. But which other mental states, and what actions? Mine, of course.
My preference must dispose me to choose chocolate when I believe it is
available, unless I have a preference that I take to be incompatible with it.
Those mental states not disposed to interact in this way with states of mine
must belong to someone else. This is plausible enough. But it seems to get
its plausibility from the idea that thinking beings derive their identity from
facts about mental unity and disunity. And that is just what I want to ques-
tion. What if there are simply not enough thinking beings around to match
up one to one with the mental systems?
Someone might solve this problem by saying that thinking beings are
mental systems. The existence of two systems of mental states that interact
in the way the functionalist theory specifies guarantees the existence of two
thinking beings to be the subjects of those states because that is what think-
ing beings are. This is more or less the view of Wilkes and Rovane. But it
isn’t Shoemaker’s view, and certainly doesn’t follow from functionalism.
There is more to be said about the synthesis argument. But as it stands it
is inconclusive at best.
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6 .
I will now state my case against the Cohabitation Claim. I will discuss more
arguments in support of the Claim afterwards, in the form of objections to
my own view.
I object to the Claim because it is inconsistent with our being material
things of flesh and blood. (By ‘material thing’ I mean roughly something
made of matter that has mass and shape and a location in space and that can
persist through time.) My argument has three premises.
First, if Even and Odd are two, they differ psychologically and behavior-
ally. There must be times, for instance, when Even is conscious and acting
and Odd is unconscious, or at any rate unable to perceive or act. There is no
point in saying that there are two people in the story unless we can attribute
the even-day thoughts and actions to just one of them and attribute the odd-
day thoughts and actions entirely to the other, so that each gets exactly one
personality. If one person with two personalities is bad, surely two people
with two personalities each is worse.
Second, any two material people who differ mentally and behaviorally in
the way that Even and Odd would have to differ, if they were two, will differ
in some non-mental respect that accounts for their mental difference. At any
rate they will be very likely to differ non-mentally. Two immaterial souls
might perhaps differ systematically in their intrinsic mental attributes with-
out differing in any non-mental way, but two material people couldn’t.
Third, if Even and Odd are material things, they have the same qualitative,
non-mental properties. (Such “non-qualitative” properties as being identical
with Even are of course excluded.) They are made of the same matter and have
the same surroundings, evolutionary history, and so on.
Here, then, is the argument. Suppose Even and Odd are material things. If
they are two, they will differ mentally in a way that implies some non-men-
tal difference. But since they “share” a single human being, they cannot differ
in any such non-mental way. So they cannot be two. Again: if they are mate-
rial things of flesh and blood, sharing a single human being, they will be
non-mentally exactly alike, and therefore mentally exactly alike, and therefore
one and not two. So Even and Odd must be one—unless, perhaps, they are
not material things.
What might they be instead? Bundles of mental particulars, most likely,
since that is what the main arguments for the Cohabitation Claim seem to
imply—though as far as the present argument goes they could also be simple
immaterial substances, mental events, or even wholly abstract things akin to
computer programs. We agreed that the Cohabitation Claim was true just in
the case that Even and Odd, in our story, were two. Hence, the Claim implies
that the people in split-personality cases are not material things. There are
simply no two material things that could be Even and Odd. There isn’t room
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for them. And if they are not material things, neither are the rest of us. The
Cohabitation Claim leads to dualism. (If we’re not material things, doesn’t it
follow that we are immaterial things? And isn’t that dualism?) Since I take
dualism to be false, I conclude that there could not be two of us in any case
of split personality.
I wish I had a good argument for the claim that we are material things.
But this is such a fundamental point that it is hard to say anything that will
not be seen, perhaps rightly, to assume the point at issue. Still, it seems
true. When we look in a mirror we seem to see ourselves, and not merely the
material shell that houses the invisible things that we really are. I presume
that most readers think that they are material. If you like, you can see my
argument as supporting the conditional claim that if we are material, then the
Cohabitation Claim is false.
Let us now examine the argument’s main premises. The first, that Even
and Odd would differ mentally if they were two, needs no defense. What about
the second? Could two people—two material beings—that were alike in every
non-mental respect still differ mentally in the way that Even and Odd are sup-
posed to differ? Could there be that sort of mental difference without any non-
mental difference?
If so, two beings made of the same atoms arranged in the same way, with
the same surroundings and evolutionary history, might be mentally as differ-
ent from one another as you are from me. Intrinsic mental properties would
not even “weakly” supervene on physical ones. (Mental properties weakly
supervene on physical properties if, necessarily, two beings with the same
physical properties would have the same mental properties. Most of those
who call themselves physicalists believe that the mental supervenes on the
physical in a stronger sense than this.)
Now some of those who believe that we are material things deny weak
psychophysical supervenience. They say that there is a material object
numerically different from me called “my body” which, despite being physi-
cally identical with me (with the same surroundings and evolutionary his-
tory), does not and cannot think. Could this—if it were true—help us to
understand how Even and Odd might differ mentally?
Well, if we ask why the activities of my body’s nervous system should be
insufficient for it to think or experience (despite being identical to the activi-
ties of my own nervous system), we shall probably be told that it is because
people and their bodies belong to different ontological kinds. My body cannot
think, despite being physically just like me, because it is a body, with iden-
tity conditions different from those of people. (Part of what makes something
an ontological kind is presumably that it determines the identity conditions of
its members.) Mental properties, then, are grounded in part in such non-
physical properties as ontological kinds, which are not determined entirely by
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a thing’s microphysical structure and surroundings. To explain why some-
thing is conscious we must mention not only its physical properties, but
also the fact that it is a person and not, say, a person’s body. (For an account
of this sort see Shoemaker 1999.) But even if we grant this, it can hardly
explain how two physically identical people, with the same surroundings and
history, could be radically different mentally. Even and Odd belong to the
same ontological kind. So rejecting weak psycho-physical supervenience is
little help in explaining how Even and Odd could be qualitatively different.
In fact the argument against the Cohabitation Claim need not rely on
supervenience claims of any sort. We needn’t insist that any two material
people indistinguishable in their non-mental qualities must be mentally alike.
It would be enough if they were likely to be mentally alike. It would even be
enough if they were likely to be mentally very similar. This would be so if,
for instance, a thing’s non-mental properties reliably but fallibly caused its
mental properties. For in that case Even and Odd’s being non-mentally alike
would make significant mental differences between them improbable. We
should expect their mental properties to converge in the future. And we
should expect the people in most other cases of split personality to be men-
tally alike.
But advocates of the Cohabitation Claim believe that the psychological
differences between “cohabiting” people in cases of the sort we have described
are not improbable or temporary, but systematic and lawlike. It is not sup-
posed to be a freakish accident that Even and Odd have different mental prop-
erties. It may be a freakish accident that there are two people there in the first
place; but given that they are there, it is supposed to be unsurprising that
they differ mentally. If such people are nonetheless exactly alike non-men-
tally, it is hard to see how there could be any interesting connection at all
between mental and non-mental properties. If nothing else, that makes it
unlikely that people are material things.
We could put the point like this: Why do Even and Odd differ mentally
and behaviourally, if indeed they do? What could explain the supposed fact
that Even is conscious and acting while Odd, at the same time, is uncon-
scious and unable to act? If there is any connection between mental and non-
mental properties, we should expect this mental difference to be grounded at
least in part in some non-mental difference.
So much for the second premise. Any materialist who thinks that Even
and Odd are two will deny the third premise, and argue that they differ in
some non-mental way. This poses a challenge for materialist friends of the
Cohabitation Claim. They will have to find two material things in the story
that Even and Odd could be—objects that differ in some physical or at any
rate non-mental way that can account for their supposed mental and behav-
ioral difference. Since Even and Odd belong to the same ontological kind, it
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is hard to see how their mental difference could be grounded in the sort of
non-physical difference that is supposed to explain why people and their bod-
ies differ mentally. So Even and Odd must apparently differ in some physical
way. They could not, after all, be made of the same atoms at the same time.
I doubt whether any such materially different things can be found, at least
without making some gratuitous and highly implausible assumptions. But
let us have a look. There would seem to be two possibilities. Even and Odd
might exist at different times, rather than both at once. Or they might exist at
the same time but be composed of different spatial parts.
7 .
Suppose Even exists only when Odd doesn’t. At the end of an even day Even
perishes and Odd comes into being. That would give Even and Odd a non-
mental difference that could explain how they differ mentally and behavior-
ally: if Even’s C-fibers fire at noon on Tuesday, this will not be true of Odd,
since he won’t exist then.
This assumes that a concrete material object can exist intermittently: it
can pass away at the end of one day, not exist at all during the next, and come
back into being on the third day. Even might come into being for the first
time in 1950 and pass away for the last time in 2030, yet exist for only 40
years in all. Someone who perishes now may be resurrected in the next age.
This is a contentious assumption. Even if we grant it, though, we don’t
get a plausible description of the story of Even and Odd. People don’t just
come to be and pass away at random. When we begin and end is disputed, but
nearly everyone agrees that if a person ever comes into existence, it is at
some point between conception and the onset of rationality, and that if a per-
son ever perishes, it is at biological death, or when her mental capacities
decay beyond a certain point or her remains dissolve into dust. But no such
thing happens to Even at the beginning or at the end of any even day. So
why should he come into being and pass away then? Apparently just because
he gains consciousness at the beginning of an even day and loses it at the end
of the day. But if Even must perish when he goes unconscious, then so must
the rest of us. (It was part of the argument that Even and Odd are beings of
the same sort as you and I.) No one could continue to exist without remain-
ing conscious. The phrase ‘unconscious person’ would be an oxymoron. We
could never sleep. My bed at night would contain no person, or anything that
ever was or could ever come to be a person. No one thinks that.
Perhaps Even perishes at the end of each even day not because he loses
consciousness, but because Odd appears. We can survive falling asleep, so
long as no new personality takes over. But this is no help. Odd mustn’t
appear until Even has gone—that was the point of saying that one exists
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only while the other doesn’t. Odd appears on the stage too late to push Even
off it.
Couldn’t Even and Odd be different temporal parts of one human being?
Suppose a person consists of those temporal parts or “stages” of a human
being (or in science fiction of several human beings) that relate to one
another in a certain way. And suppose that the even-day stages relate to each
other in that way, and the odd-day stages do as well, but the even-day stages
don’t relate in that way to the odd-day stages. Then the aggregate of even-day
stages would be one person, Even, and the aggregate of odd-day stages would
be another, Odd. In that case Odd’s presence on odd days wouldn’t cause Even
to exist only on even days. The two would exist on alternate days simply
because that is where their temporal parts are.
Of course, we can say this only if Even and Odd, and you and I and other
familiar things, have temporal parts—we ourselves, and not just our histo-
ries. This is a substantive metaphysical claim, and one that many advocates
of the Cohabitation Claim reject.
But there is trouble even for those who accept the ontology of temporal
parts. What relation would bind together all and only the even-day stages of
the human being, and all and only the odd-day stages, into people? The usual
“four-dimensionalist” view is that a person is a maximal aggregate of psycho-
logically interrelated person-stages (e.g. Lewis 1976). There is dispute about
just what this psychological relation is, but all agree that it is sufficient for
two stages to be psychologically related if, for instance, one can remember an
experience of the other. But the even- and odd-day stages in our story are psy-
chologically related in just this way. When the even-day personality goes
dormant at the end of an even day, the memories of that day’s experiences are
not extinguished, but continue to be realized in the human being’s brain.
They are simply not accessible then. Otherwise how could they be available
again 24 hours later? So the odd-day stages have the same memories of past
even-day experiences as the even-day stages have, and likewise for the even-
day stages with respect to past odd-day experiences. The even-day stages in
our story could not be psychologically unconnected with the odd-day stages in
the way in which your even-day stages are unconnected with my odd-day
stages (supposing we have temporal parts). For Even and Odd to be different
temporal parts of one human being, the identity of a person over time would
have to consist in something entirely different from the sort of psychological
continuity or connectedness that most philosophers think it does.
In fact Even and Odd, on this proposal, would relate in much the same
way as you would relate to the person who would result if you were to suffer
from amnesia—not philosopher’s amnesia, where all mental content is per-
manently erased, but the so-called transient global amnesia that occurs in real
life, where those contents are not erased but are only inaccessible, like a book
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locked in a drawer whose key is lost. If Even and Odd exist alternately, then
anyone who forgets his name, address, and recent history must literally cease
to exist and be replaced by someone new, even if the condition is only tem-
porary—though one may come back into existence (thereby destroying the
person who existed in the interim) when the condition is reversed. I take it
that no one would accept this. For that matter, we ought to wonder whether
the current proposal could allow for anyone to have temporal parts that were
unconscious.
In any case, we can rule out Even’s existing only when Odd doesn’t by
changing the story a bit. We imagined that the even-day personality shut
down entirely on odd days. We might say instead that it remains active but is
simply disconnected from perception and movement. Then there would some-
times be two isolated “streams of consciousness” going on within the human
being at once, but only one at a time would have anything to do with percep-
tion or action. (If Even and Odd were two, we could say that Even sometimes
remains conscious at the end of an even day but loses the ability to perceive
or act.) In that case the memories of past even-day experiences would be
accessible on odd days, and could be recalled and reflected on then, but no one
would be able to verbalize or otherwise act on them. We said that ‘Even’ was
to name the being who thinks and acts on even days. We could say instead
that Even is the being who perceives and acts on even days, and likewise,
mutatis mutandis, for ‘Odd’. I take it that this would make no real difference
to the argument. ‘Even’ and ‘Odd’ name two different people in the modified
story if they do in the original story. (Wilkes says this would actually
strengthen the case for there being two people [1988: 125].) And the modified
story is surely possible if the original is: as we have seen, the memory-traces
of even-day events must persist on odd days, even in the original story.
In the revised story we can no longer say that Even ceases to exist at the
end of each even day, for otherwise we should have two isolated streams of
consciousness going on in one person at the same time. Presumably that
person would be the subject of both streams. This is clearly the sort of thing
the Cohabitation Claim was meant to rule out. We can rule it out only by
saying that two people share the human being at once.
We can see now that the split-personality puzzle has to do both with what
it takes for a person to persist through time and with what determines how
many people there are at any one time—with both “diachronic” and “syn-
chronic” identity, as the jargon has it. We argued that any plausible account
of what sort of thing a person could survive requires Even and Odd to exist at
the same time. The challenge facing those who think that they are two is
therefore to square this with some reasonable account of what determines how
many people there are at any one time.
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Let us turn now to the second possibility, that Even and Odd differ non-men-
tally despite existing at the same time. I take this to imply that at any given
time Even must have parts that are not parts of Odd, and vice versa, the pos-
session of which helps to explain how they differ. (Two people made of the
very same parts at the same time will be alike in their qualitative, non-mental
properties.) This would seem to make Even and Odd parts of a human being,
most likely parts of its brain.2 Perhaps one part of the brain supports the
even-day personality and another, physically separate part of the brain realizes
the odd-day personality, and those things are Even and Odd. That would pro-
vide the sort of non-mental difference that could account for their mental and
behavioral differences, much as physiological differences between your brain
and mine help to explain our mental differences.
Now if Even and Odd are literally parts of a brain, then you and I are also
parts of brains, or at most whole brains. (Again, Even and Odd are the same
sort of beings as the rest of us. Whatever determines the parts and boundaries
of some human people does so for all of us.) You are literally a soft, creamy-
colored, two- or three-pound organ lodged between your ears: not a brain in a
vat, but a brain in a head. You are not a human being, but only a small part
of one. Human beings are not themselves intelligent or sentient, but are
merely inhabited by intelligent brains. (If human beings were also sentient,
how could anyone know that one was the brain and not the human being?)
Presumably the same would go for sentient animals of other species. I take
this to be absurd.
Well, suppose Even includes not just that part of the animal’s brain that
realizes his mental life, but all of the animal except that part that supports
Odd’s mental life, and likewise, mutatis mutandis, for Odd. If the human
being weighs 150 pounds, Even and Odd each weigh slightly less, perhaps
149 pounds. That way you and I could be whole human beings, as there is no
one else whose mental life is realized in parts of our brains.
Now both this proposal and the previous one assume that the two person-
alities in a case like that of Even and Odd would have to be realized in physi-
cally separate parts of the brain. That might be a reasonable assumption if the
brain worked like a digital computer. When my old Macintosh runs two inde-
pendent programs at once, a word processor and a web browser, say, those
programs are “realized” at any particular time in discrete sets of on-off
switches. But no one knows whether the brain works like that. And no one
takes the Cohabitation Claim to rest on any empirical assumption about how
                                                                                                        
2 This might be Carruthers’ view (1986: 227). He says that a person is “a particular func-
tional organisation of cells within the brain”, specifically that “particular network of
cellular connections” that explains one’s behavior. In split-personality cases there may
simply be two such networks. But I don’t know whether a “network of cellular connec-
tions” is supposed to be a material thing.
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the brain works. Moreover, split personality is supposed to show that two
people could share a whole human being (Lowe 1996: 31, Rovane 1998:
8n.).
In any case, the proposal is problematic. If Even’s heart and liver are parts
of him, why not his brain—the whole of it? It’s his brain, isn’t it? (Imagine
someone insisting that your left kidney was a part of you but not your right
kidney.) We cannot take this claim seriously without some sort of theoretical
justification. It would have to follow from some general principle about what
makes something a part of one. I can think of no credible principle of this
sort. Here is the sort of thing that would be needed: The parts of a person are
all and only those parts of the animal associated with him, save those that are
involved in someone else’s mental life. (If the two mental systems are real-
ized in overlapping parts of the brain, we shall need something more compli-
cated.) No such principle seems to me to have any independent plausibility.
Suppose a devious neurosurgeon somehow arranged things so that some
memories accessible only to you were stored somewhere within my brain.
Would a bit of my brain thereby cease to be a part of me? Would the surgeon
have made me a bit smaller and lighter? Surely not.3
9 .
To sum up. Friends of the Cohabitation Claim face hard questions: What
things are Even and Odd, or more generally the people who share a single
human being in possible or actual cases of split personality? In particular,
what non-mental properties do they have? What are they made of? What are
their spatial boundaries? Or are they located in space at all? What non-mental
difference between them accounts for their striking psychological differences?
These questions must have answers, and their answers will have implications
for the rest of us as well. I don’t say that they are unanswerable. But those
possible answers that are compatible with the Cohabitation Claim appear ad
hoc and implausible at best. The Cohabitation Claim may be intuitively
attractive. But few of its advocates have thought carefully about its meta-
physical implications. I believe that once we see those implications, the
Claim will lose its appeal—except perhaps to those who believe on other
                                                                                                        
3 The principle also rules out our being human animals—that is, our being identical with
human animals. Not only are we not essentially animals, but we are not animals at all.
Part of my brain could become involved in someone else’s mental life, in which case the
principle implies that it would cease to be a part of me. But it would not thereby cease to
be a part of the animal associated with me. Where an animal’s boundaries lie is not
determined by matters of psychology. (I discuss this in Olson 1997: ch. 6.) Thus, the
animal could come to have parts that were not parts of me, and so could come to be
numerically different from me. And two things that could be numerically different a re
numerically different. If we are not human animals, we ought to wonder why those
animals can’t think, or, if they can, how we know they aren’t us. But that is another topic
(see e.g. Olson 1997, ch. 5).
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grounds that we are immaterial substances or bundles of impressions, rather
than things of flesh and blood.
That concludes my argument against the Cohabitation Claim. I turn now,
briefly, to some objections to my view that there could never be more than
one thinking being in a case of split personality.
Can we coherently describe the split-personality case without supposing
that there are at least two mental subjects there (Puccetti 1973: 351, Ander-
son 1976)? Suppose Even insults his boss on an even day. Even will
remember that event; but Odd, it seems, will not. That is a contradiction
unless Even and Odd are numerically different.
I claim that Odd does remember insulting his boss, but owing to his
unusual condition he is unable, on odd days, to say that he does. Being
unable to report or otherwise act on an experience one has had and not forgot-
ten may be strange, especially if one is conscious at the time; but it is not
impossible. It is just what we should expect in a strange case like this one. It
could even happen to you: if we inject sodium amytal into your left carotid
artery, temporarily “anaesthetizing” your speech hemisphere, you will remain
conscious but be unable to report on your past experiences.
Here is a harder case. Suppose Even painfully stubs his toe on an even
day. Odd (the objection goes) will feel nothing, since his experience is unaf-
fected, on even days, by alterations to Even’s sense organs. So if Even were
Odd he would be both in pain and not in pain at once. The problem is espe-
cially acute on the second variant of the story, in which there are two isolated
streams of consciousness going on at once.
It is not immediately clear what I ought to say about this. But here is a
description that seems as good as any, and which appears to be free from
contradiction. Despite appearances, the subject of those even-day experiences
not affected by the sense organs is in pain (since he is also the subject of
those experiences that are affected by them). He even knows that he is in
pain. At the same time, he may believe that he is not in pain. The reason
why he can hold such blatantly contradictory beliefs at once is that his mental
life is split into subsystems that don’t interact in the usual way.
If you don’t like this, and doubt whether any coherent description of this
case can avoid postulating two different thinkers, consider that similar things
can happen to any of us under special conditions. Psychologists report that if
we tell someone who is hypnotized but otherwise normal that she will feel
no pain, then immerse her hand in ice-water for several minutes (ordinarily
painful enough), she will sit patiently and claim to be comfortable—but may
write with her other hand, if she cannot see it, that she is in pain.4 If we
must say that there are two people in this case, all bets are off. Otherwise,
                                                                                                        
4 Wilkes (1988: 107f.); see also Glover (1988: 30). Zemach argues that there must be two
people in cases like this (1986: 142).
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the correct description of it, whatever it is, would seem a good candidate for
being the correct description of the toe-stubbing case.
A related objection is that my view rules out any acceptable account of
what makes someone responsible for an action. Even is not responsible for
Odd’s actions (the ones done on odd days). But someone is responsible for
them. So if there were just one person in the story, he would be both respon-
sible and not responsible for those actions.
Well, why isn’t Even—the one who acts on even days—responsible for
the things done on odd days? To say that it is because he didn’t do them, or
doesn’t remember doing them, would be to assume the point at issue. Per-
haps it is because he cannot verbally recall doing or planning those things, or
indeed any of the events surrounding them, and because he is not disposed to
act in a similar way again. It is doubtful whether that is enough to excuse
someone entirely from responsibility; but even if it is, it is true of Even only
on even days. So at most the objection shows that Even is not responsible
on even days for the things done on odd days. It in no way suggests that any-
one is both responsible and not responsible for something at the same time.
It may well be unclear in the story just who is responsible, and when, for
what actions. But I don’t think that is the fault of my claim that there is just
one person there. We aren’t very good at making moral judgments even in
ordinary situations. So it is no surprise that this outré case should baffle us.
“Consider the human being in the story. Because his mental life is so
disunified, he does not count as a person, or a moral agent, or a subject of
experience. Otherwise we might as well say that something made up of you
and me would be a person. (Try imagining what it would be like to have a
mental life that was no more unified than yours is unified with mine.) On the
other hand, Even and Odd are clearly people, moral agents, and subjects of
experience. So your view cannot be right.”
But there is no point insisting that there must be two people in the story
unless there could be, and our arguments suggest that there couldn’t (unless,
perhaps, we are immaterial). The mere fact that the human being in the story
doesn’t satisfy your favorite definition of ‘person’ hardly implies that there
must be two such “people” there. In fact I see no reason to deny that our
human being is a person in Wilkes’s sense, or in the familiar Lockean sense:
a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider
itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places. He is of
course rational, intelligent, and self-aware in a peculiar way—twice over, as it
were. But that doesn’t make him any less rational or intelligent or self-aware.
I don’t expect these brief remarks to set readers’ minds entirely at ease. My
proposal is certainly surprising. But those who have trouble believing it
should consider the alternatives.
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I will end with a few speculative remarks. What would it mean if there could
never be two or more people in a case of split personality? It would do away
with a widely held thesis about personal identity, namely that the number of
people is determined by facts about mental unity and disunity. The idea is
that the number of people—or agents or thinking beings—is necessarily
equal to something like the number of systems of thought and action that are
individually well-integrated, yet appropriately separate and independent of one
another. We might call this the Psychological Identity Principle. The Princi-
ple implies that there must be two people in the story of Even and Odd. I
believe that it is false because there may not always be a different being
available to be the subject of each such mental system. That in turn is
because people are not purely mental beings. They have non-mental proper-
ties as well.
This is not quite such a radical departure from tradition as it may appear.
The Principle is still almost true, in that most possible situations, and
probably all actual ones, conform to it. In this respect it is at least as well off
as Newtonian Mechanics. This fact helps to explain the Principle’s long and
distinguished history and the fact that most philosophers find it self-evident.
Psychiatrists and others concerned with real-life situations can rely on it.
Only philosophers need be wary.
What, then, stands to the Psychological Identity Principle as General
Relativity stands to Newtonian Mechanics? What does determine the number
of people or thinking beings in a situation, if not facts about mental unity
and disunity? What makes it the case that you and I are two, rather than one
person with a split personality? What makes it the case that there are six bil-
lion rational beings living on our planet, rather than some other number?
Here is a modest conjecture: there are six billion people because there are six
billion human beings—human animals, members of the species Homo
sapiens—who, for whatever reason (presumably on account of their mental
features), qualify as people, and no other beings that qualify. So we might
replace the Psychological Identity Principle with something like this:
Necessarily, there are n people if and only if there are n human
beings of the right sort,
where the qualification ‘of the right sort’ is meant to embody our definition
of ‘person’ (it might be short for ‘who are rational, self-conscious moral
agents’, or for something like Wilkes’ proposal). I assume that what deter-
mines the number of human beings in a situation has nothing to do with
psychology, but is a matter of ordinary biology. What determines the number
of human beings is much the same as what determines the number of animals
of other species. We might therefore call this the Biological Identity Princi-
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ple. It probably agrees with the Psychological Identity Principle in all actual
cases, though not in the case of Even and Odd.
There might, of course, be non-human people: intelligent Martians, gods,
or what have you. If so, we must restrict the Principle to human people. (I
don’t know how to generalize it to account for non-human people. There may
not be any unified identity conditions for people in general, any more than
there are unified identity conditions for material objects in general.)
I don’t claim that the Biological Identity Principle is the only alternative
to the Psychological Identity Principle. Nor is this the place to argue that it
is superior to its rivals—though I might mention that it has the advantage of
following from the plausible assumption that we are human animals. But we
must abandon tradition if we are to reach the truth about personal identity.5
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